Date   

Re: Bad crash

OL.Guerbetal
 

Am 04.08.2013 10:43, schrieb Paul:
I suppose that 'in-cab' signalling does improve matters greatly but
until we 'close the loop' properly, we are going to have human error
based accidents. The London Victoria tube line achieved something
like auto control in 1967 by a very basic 6 (I think) commands sent
via audio frequencies in the running rails.
I think the point is that you won't be able to close the loop. As Wolfgang said, not even the M2 is safe. Because the whole thing was deigned by safety engineers who are human beings as all others and they do make mistakes.

The "ding ding and away accidents" are a problem of our railways, sure. But, again, more a problem of private railways than SBB. Go and have a look at history. When was the last fatality on a SBB line because of this?

It is very sad that it happened now, but it is far from being "the typical SBB accident where fatalities occur".

But back to in-cab signalling. On a proper railway (sorry, nothing against the Victoria line) not every train stops at the same distance. The driver is responsible to enter the correct data so that in-cab signalling can work properly. Next point will be that the maintenance of the brakes is at the point so that correct data will lead to correct results. Etc. You will always find a point, where a human being made a mistake and that will lead to an accident. Even if you employ hundreds of safety engineers.

Forgive my ignorance but on lines in Switzerland used by the TGV, are
there special signalling provisions?
A TGV must have the equipment that the infrastructure requires, not the other way round.

Markus, G�rbetal


Re: Bad crash

OL.Guerbetal
 

Am 04.08.2013 16:04, schrieb Wolfgang Keller:
Honestly, your comment exhibits a total lack of knowledge in the field
of safety engineering.
Oh my dear. I should tell you about a nightmare. That was of world that safety engineers had designed. Then add the lawyers and we are lost.

I understand every bit of your message but I still don't think you are right. Sorry.

Markus, G�rbetal


Re: Bad crash

Wolfgang Keller
 

I'm afraid that the collision was a consequence of a human error of
the driver of the Domino train set.
A typical "human error" in a situation ("Gruppenausfahrsignal" - too
lazy to look up the translation, sorry) apparently very typical in
Switzerland.
The error wasn't due to the Gruppenausfahrsignal and this type of
signal isn't "very typical" for Switzerland.
It's has historically been a typical cause for accidents and
near-misses in Switzerland. Unlike other countries, where railway
accidents have other, often also typical, causes.

It still exists in some stations but most of them are on private
company infrastructure. They will disappear with the ongoing renewal
of safety installations (Stellwerkersatz). If you know a very little
bit of the railway system, you will know that a renewal program of
that size can't be realized within a few months.
Again; The problem has been known for *decades* already.

And mesures to provide a temporary (limited) remedy could have been
implemented almost instantly. It's just a matter of whether management
decides to just conveniently cheaptalk the issue under the carpet or to
actually assume their responsibility (which they always pretend to have
when it comes to their obscene "comepnsation") and take care of safety.

The error was an error and the accident was due to not having secured
every single action of the driver (no loop in the track). As long as
we will have drivers, we will have accidents.
That's the whole point of having train control.

Only M2 in Lausanne is (theoretically) safe,
It isn't. As any operator of driverless systems with sufficient empiric
experience has had to learn the hard way sooner or later.

as it has no driver who can make a mistake.
It doesn't have drivers, but there are other sources for mistakes.
Such as e.g. the system designers, operations and maintenance staff
etc...

Why has SBB *still* not set up procedures to prevent such accidents
due to *known* safety problems with signalling equipment
installations? That these installations pose a significant safety
risk has been empirically known (from accidents, of course) for
decades iirc.
If I count the fatalities because of such accidents and compare it to
the fatalities due to level crossings, I don't understand that level
crossings are still allowed at all.
That's an entirely different issue.

Among others, since at level crossings, it's mostly the originators of
the accidents (car drivers) who die, less often the innocent train
passengers.

It isn't a friendly Summer for railways in Europe, is it?
I wonder how long they want to keep parroting that obscene lie that
the accident series at SBB has nothing to do with top management.
So you think that the 54-year old driver passed the red signal
because he has the wrong boss? Interesting theory.
*sigh*

Engineers with some practical experience in safety engineering (or
having been trained by such experienced engineers as I happen to have
been during my vocational training as a safety engineer) know about
"human factors" and especially about the importance of "organisational
factors".

For people who are not professional safety engineers (such as you,
apparently), one very interesting piece of literature about such issues
is the book by Richard Feynman about his experience in the Challenger
commission. Just look up the title on Wikipedia, it's really very
instructive to read.

Within organisations (such as SBB), "accidents" are (almost) always
manufactured, they don't just "happen" incidentally.

And the abyssmal degradation of working conditions since Andreas Meyer
(and the hench(wo)men he took with him from DB) took office as CEO of
SBB has been extensively documented.

And the accidents in Brétigny and Santiago de Compostela were also
the fault of the SBB management?
No, but of RFF (maintenance) management for Bretigny and ADIF
(previously GIF) management (or whatever organisation designed the
signalling system) for Santiago.

Perhaps your rant would be more appreciated in the Blick am Abend
online comments. Many members of *this* group are glad that railways
still have a human factor and not everything is automatic and safe.
Honestly, your comment exhibits a total lack of knowledge in the field
of safety engineering.

Sincerely,

Wolfgang


Re: Bad crash

Kidger Paul
 

--- In SwissRail@yahoogroups.com, Guerbetaler <muesche2-swissrail@...> wrote:

The error wasn't due to the Gruppenausfahrsignal and this type of signal
isn't "very typical" for Switzerland. It still exists in some stations
but most of them are on private company infrastructure. They will
disappear with the ongoing renewal of safety installations
(Stellwerkersatz). If you know a very little bit of the railway system,
you will know that a renewal program of that size can't be realized
within a few months.

The error was an error and the accident was due to not having secured
every single action of the driver (no loop in the track). As long as we
will have drivers, we will have accidents. Only M2 in Lausanne is
(theoretically) safe, as it has no driver who can make a mistake.
Markus
When I studied Process Control theory at college, the basic elements of 'Closed Loop Control' were, Detection, Comparison with the Set-Point, Output, Actuation of the control element. Now controlling the flow of water in a pipe is no different, (from a theoretical aspect) from a train on a track apart from the last item which relies on a man seeing a coded message (the line-side signals) and moving the control mechanisms accordingly. I suppose that 'in-cab' signalling does improve matters greatly but until we 'close the loop' properly, we are going to have human error based accidents.
The London Victoria tube line achieved something like auto control in 1967 by a very basic 6 (I think) commands sent via audio frequencies in the running rails.
Forgive my ignorance but on lines in Switzerland used by the TGV, are there special signalling provisions?

Paul Kidger


Re: Bad crash

OL.Guerbetal
 

Am 03.08.2013 00:09, schrieb bs177@ggbooks.plus.com:
I would however expect a move to provide a repeater signal or loop
in similar locations where the exit signal is so far from the
platform or a white X on top like the RhB does to show that the
section ahead is occupied.
I didn't want to express that nothing has to be done. But much is under way and all remaining cases of "missing loops" will be examined. However, I don't think that a repeater signal would be of any help. In Neuhausen the signals were differently arranged but this didn't prevent the mistake. Putting the balises further away from the point of danger could be one solution. Other solutions have to be found.

Markus, G�rbetal


Re: Bad crash

bs177@...
 

--- In SwissRail@yahoogroups.com, Guerbetaler <muesche2-swissrail@...> wrote:

The error was an error and the accident was due to not having secured
every single action of the driver (no loop in the track). As long as we
will have drivers, we will have accidents.
If I count the fatalities because of such accidents and compare it to
the fatalities due to level crossings, I don't understand that level
crossings are still allowed at all. Or that even any road traffic is
still allowed in Switzerland. It's so insecure, there are numbers of
*known* safety problems. Incredible.
Well said.

BahnOnLine seems to be reporting a collision with road vehicles certainly every week and sometimes more frequently than that but I do not read clamourings for level crossings to be stopped up, or a media campaign to raise awareness of the dangers as in the UK.


So you think that the 54-year old driver passed the red signal because
he has the wrong boss? Interesting theory. And the accidents in Brétigny
and Santiago de Compostela were also the fault of the SBB management?
Again, well said.

I would however expect a move to provide a repeater signal or loop in similar locations where the exit signal is so far from the platform or a white X on top like the RhB does to show that the section ahead is occupied.

Cheers

Bruce


Re: Bad crash

OL.Guerbetal
 

Am 02.08.2013 21:15, schrieb Wolfgang Keller:
I'm afraid that the collision was a consequence of a human error of
the driver of the Domino train set.
A typical "human error" in a situation ("Gruppenausfahrsignal" - too
lazy to look up the translation, sorry) apparently very typical in
Switzerland.
The error wasn't due to the Gruppenausfahrsignal and this type of signal isn't "very typical" for Switzerland. It still exists in some stations but most of them are on private company infrastructure. They will disappear with the ongoing renewal of safety installations (Stellwerkersatz). If you know a very little bit of the railway system, you will know that a renewal program of that size can't be realized within a few months.

The error was an error and the accident was due to not having secured every single action of the driver (no loop in the track). As long as we will have drivers, we will have accidents. Only M2 in Lausanne is (theoretically) safe, as it has no driver who can make a mistake.

Why has SBB *still* not set up procedures to prevent such accidents due
to *known* safety problems with signalling equipment installations? That
these installations pose a significant safety risk has been empirically
known (from accidents, of course) for decades iirc.
If I count the fatalities because of such accidents and compare it to the fatalities due to level crossings, I don't understand that level crossings are still allowed at all. Or that even any road traffic is still allowed in Switzerland. It's so insecure, there are numbers of *known* safety problems. Incredible.

It isn't a friendly Summer for railways in Europe, is it?
I wonder how long they want to keep parroting that obscene lie that the
accident series at SBB has nothing to do with top management.
So you think that the 54-year old driver passed the red signal because he has the wrong boss? Interesting theory. And the accidents in Br�tigny and Santiago de Compostela were also the fault of the SBB management?

Perhaps your rant would be more appreciated in the Blick am Abend online comments. Many members of *this* group are glad that railways still have a human factor and not everything is automatic and safe.

Markus, G�rbetal


Re: Bad crash

Wolfgang Keller
 

I'm afraid that the collision was a consequence of a human error of
the driver of the Domino train set.
A typical "human error" in a situation ("Gruppenausfahrsignal" - too
lazy to look up the translation, sorry) apparently very typical in
Switzerland.

Why has SBB *still* not set up procedures to prevent such accidents due
to *known* safety problems with signalling equipment installations? That
these installations pose a significant safety risk has been empirically
known (from accidents, of course) for decades iirc.

It isn't a friendly Summer for railways in Europe, is it?
I wonder how long they want to keep parroting that obscene lie that the
accident series at SBB has nothing to do with top management.

Sincerely,

Wolfgang


Re: SIG carriages on the Snowdon Mountain Railway

OL.Guerbetal
 

Am 02.08.2013 14:56, schrieb Andrew Moglestue:
Although it is not stated in any of the books I have, it would
appear that one of the Swiss built carriages must have been
scrapped - probably the original No 7.
Wasn't there an accident at one point in the line's history? Maybe
that has a connection to the coach being scrapped?
The accident was in 1895, it was the first train that derailed, but the SIG carriages were delivered in 1923.

Markus, G�rbetal


Re: SIG carriages on the Snowdon Mountain Railway

tudor erich
 

Wasn't there an accident at one point in the line's history?
Maybe that has a connection to the coach being scrapped?

Opening day.
 
One fatality.
 
Someone who left the train rather than remain in it.....
 
Bernard


Re: SIG carriages on the Snowdon Mountain Railway

bs177@...
 

--- In SwissRail@yahoogroups.com, Andrew Moglestue <amogles@...> wrote:

Although it is not stated in any of the books I have, it would appear
that one of the Swiss built carriages must have been scrapped -
probably the original No 7.
Wasn't there an accident at one point in the line's history?
Maybe that has a connection to the coach being scrapped?
Although a coach was damaged in an accident in 1924, the one you are thinking about was on 6 April 1896 which wrote off locomotive No. 1.

Cheers

Bruce


Re: SIG carriages on the Snowdon Mountain Railway

Andrew Moglestue
 

Although it is not stated in any of the books I have, it would appear
that one of the Swiss built carriages must have been scrapped -
probably the original No 7.
Wasn't there an accident at one point in the line's history? Maybe that has a connection to the coach being scrapped?


Re: SIG carriages on the Snowdon Mountain Railway

bs177@...
 

--- In SwissRail@yahoogroups.com, Guerbetaler <muesche2-swissrail@...> wrote:


Final question: What has happened to carriage 9?

Who can help?
Further to last, Peter Johnson's Illustrated History of the Snowdon Mountain Railway states that "at some stage, perhaps during the 1950's rebuilding programme, the carriages were renumbered, the Lancaster carriages becoming 2-5 and 8 and the 1923 built vehicles Nos 6 & 7" (formerly 8 & 9).

He further states that "The Lancaster open carriage was converted to be a works car." Although its main duties have been transferred to the 2006 Hunslet built wagon, it was further rebuilt with a larger personnel cabin and is referred to as No 1 in the carriage fleet.

Although it is not stated in any of the books I have, it would appear that one of the Swiss built carriages must have been scrapped - probably the original No 7.

Cheers

Bruce


Re: Moving a station building

tudor erich
 

Fascinating..
 
Thank you,
 
Bernard


Re: Moving a station building

OL.Guerbetal
 

Am 02.08.2013 07:49, schrieb tudoryork:
What is the story here please? Is the building being moved so it can
be used for another purpose? Is the site of the old station being
used for road re-alignment, railway revision or something else?
The Schnaus-Strada station has been closed for passenger traffic for 20
years or so. Now a goods terminal for the valley (Vorderrheintal) will be built there and the old, so far useless, station building had to go. But the community of Schnaus found the building to be an important part of the village and wanted it to be kept. So it was decided to move the building some 50 m away. RhB will use it for the new signalling equipent and to get some rooms for their staff. The movement was done in 2.5 hours and the additional cost was only CHF 75'000. (info from RhB press release)

Markus, G�rbetal


Re: SIG carriages on the Snowdon Mountain Railway

bs177@...
 

--- In SwissRail@yahoogroups.com, Guerbetaler <muesche2-swissrail@...> wrote:

Final question: What has happened to carriage 9?

Who can help?
Ransome Wallis in his guide by Ian Allan in 1964 (rev 1967) states that "In 1921-1922 three further coaches were supplied to the railway by the Societe Industrielle Suisse of Neuhausen and were brough to England loaded on flat wagons of the Swiss Federal Railways by way of the Zeebrugge-Harwich train ferry.

There were now nine coaches on the railway but the roofless vehicle of the first batch was converted at Llanberis into a caboose. The original frames and bogies were retained but on the leading (or upper) half, a totally enclosed caboose or guards van was constructed with a fuel bunker capable of carrying one ton of coal or coke. A 700 gallon water tank is carried on the other part of the frames."

He further goes on to say that
"in 1951 in the railway workshops at Llanberis, a start was made to reconstruct all the coaches with enclosed bodies --- Seven coaches were dealt with ..........The remaining old coach has been scrapped."

Hope this helps, I have three further books in my stock which I can refer to. If I find which carriage was scrapped and which converted, I'll get back to you.

Cheers

bruce


Re: Moving a station building

tudor erich
 

have you seen a station building loaded on a truck, moved and put at
a new site by a crane? No, not on a model railway! RhB did it. See
the photos Christian Ticar kindly provided:
<http://groups.yahoo.com/group/SwissRail/photos/album/727701683/pic/list>


Hello Markus,
 
What is the story here please?
 
Is the building being moved so it can be used for another purpose?
 
Is the site of the old station being used for road re-alignment, railway revision or something else?


Re: Bad crash

Bill Bolton
 

On Thu, 01 Aug 2013 19:13:24 +0200, Markus wrote:

- the driver may quit the stop announcement ("sich befreien") and
proceed, saying with this act that he has seen the green signal. Still
Maybe you mean "acknowledge" ("quittieren")?
Not exactly

To quit = to exit, to leave.
sich befreien = to dispense from, to unchain, to exonerate, to exempt,
to free from, but none of these translations is very exact in the
context. To exit or to leave wouldn't be wrong in my opinion.
"the driver may 'cancel' the stop announcement" is probably an
appropriate phrasing in English

Cheers,

Bill

Bill Bolton
Sydney, Australia


Moving a station building

OL.Guerbetal
 

You might have heard of buildings that are moved away from their original site without having been taken apart and being rebuilt. Recently the Chêne-Bourg station building in Genève made such a travel, shown in this video
<http://www.tdg.ch/geneve/actu-genevoise/L-ancienne-gare-de-CheneBourg-demenage/story/11495341>

But have you seen a station building loaded on a truck, moved and put at a new site by a crane? No, not on a model railway! RhB did it. See the photos Christian Ticar kindly provided:
<http://groups.yahoo.com/group/SwissRail/photos/album/727701683/pic/list>

Markus, Gürbetal


SIG carriages on the Snowdon Mountain Railway

OL.Guerbetal
 

...or: whom to trust?

From the official SMR web site I take a list saying that coaches 6 and 7 were built in 1923 by SIG. Coach number 8 is shown as Lancaster 1895 which sounds a bit odd.

Thomas Middlemass writes in his Encyclopedia of Narrow Gauge Railways of Great Britain and Ireland that the first five coaches were built at Lancaster and that in 1923 four coaches were imported from Switzerland.

Also the recent SIG delivery list by VRS shows four carriages:
type C4 number 6–7
type C4 number 8–9 (open)

Other sources, among them "Welsh Narrow Gauge in the 1980s" by David Cox, speak of six original coaches and three coaches of 1921-22. Cox says the latter have "sloping front windows" which I had thought were to be found on the original coaches which had been open and were only later enclosed. From this picture I guessed it was carriage 2 (number in the black stripe) with locomotive 4 (shield put in below). However, most pictures don't show a number on the carriages.
<http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Snowdon_Mountain_Railway_-_geograph.org.uk_-_888592.jpg>

The next picture would then show an SIG coach (and carriage 10 from 1987 behind):
<http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Snowdon_Mountain_Railway,_Llanberis_Station_-_geograph.org.uk_-_794985.jpg>

I still have a theory...
As numbers 8–9 were described as open in the SIG list, they might later have been enclosed like the original Lancaster carriages, while numbers 6–7 still have their original design, seen in the second above picture. This would also explain why the SMR lists number 8 under the Lancaster builds, as it was identically rebuilt.

Final question: What has happened to carriage 9?

Who can help?

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